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Introduction

Models of costly external ﬁnance have enhanced the empirical performance of dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium models. The richer internal propagation and ampliﬁcation
mechanism, induced by the presence of ﬁnancing frictions, is typically able to replicate the
observed hump-shape responses of the main macroeconomic aggregates to the underlying
shocks in the economy.
In this paper we investigate the properties of the basic propagation mechanism in models
of costly external ﬁnance. Speciﬁcally, we ask whether the asset pricing ﬂuctuations induced
by the presence of ﬁnancing frictions are empirically plausible. Since the richer dynamics in
this class of models are essentially driven by ﬂuctuations in the value of ﬁnancial assets, our
approach provides an important alternative dimension for analyzing the properties of the
propagation mechanism.
To accomplish this, we incorporate costly external ﬁnance into a speciﬁc dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium model, developed by Bernanke and Gertler (1989), and studied
in detail by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), and explore its implications for the properties of
the returns on the key ﬁnancial assets, such as stocks, bonds and risky loans. We then
compare our ﬁndings with those of standard frictionless environments, with and without
adjustment costs of investment.
Our ﬁndings are as follows. First, models with costly external ﬁnance deliver a premium
on equity returns that is higher by a factor of 10 to 20, than comparable frictionless models,
with or without adjustment costs. While this is still far from matching the observed equity
premium, it does improve the performance of the baseline model signiﬁcantly. Second, while
the presence of ﬁnancing frictions changes the dynamic properties of consumption, and hence
of the relevant stochastic discount factor, the main force behind the larger premium is the
1

much larger variations in stock returns in the presence of ﬁnancing frictions. Third, as in
a standard neoclassical model with convex adjustment costs in investment, the ampliﬁed
ﬂuctuations in stock returns are induced by movements in the price of capital, associated
with the changes in the marginal costs to investment. Finally, however, we show that this
behavior of marginal costs, which is also at the heart of the business cycle implications of the
ﬁnancing frictions model, requires procyclical movements in the default premium, a property
not evident in the data.
The intuition for our results is simple. The empirical success of the costly external
ﬁnance model lies in part in the fact that, for ﬁxed amount of internal funds, more investment
requires more borrowing, which raises monitoring costs and, consequently, the cost of external
funds. It is this positive relation between investment and borrowing costs that generates
an increase in marginal adjustment costs, and slows down capital accumulation, in the
early stages of an expansion, thus making it possible to obtain hump-shaped responses
to underlying shocks. However, while this rise in marginal costs helps to generate a large
volatility in stock returns, it is necessarily associated with a procyclical rise in the default
premium. Thus, the very mechanism behind the realistic movements in the key aggregates
is also responsible for the models’ shortcoming along the asset pricing dimension.
Our ﬁndings highlight the intimate link between the behavior of asset prices and the
dynamic pattern of macro-economic aggregates. Accordingly, focusing on asset prices places
important restrictions on the nature of the underlying ﬁnancing frictions. Speciﬁcally, in
the model studied here, ﬁnancing constraints help generate richer dynamics for the typical
macroeconomic aggregates; however, these constraints also seem to strain the model’s ability
to match certain key ﬁnancial data.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model.

2

Section 3 contains our quantitative analysis and provides the intuition for many of our
results. A ﬁnal section oﬀers some concluding remarks.

2

Model

In this section, we describe a general equilibrium model with costly external ﬁnance driven
by endogenous agency costs. To allow us to investigate the asset pricing implications of this
class of models, our setup is chosen to be as close as possible to that in Carlstrom and Fuerst
(1997). This environment takes the stochastic growth model as its point of departure and
modiﬁes it by introducing ﬁnancing constraints that contribute to distort optimal capital
accumulation and thus generate a model with a much richer set of dynamics. The economy
consists of a continuum of agents with unit mass. The agents are classiﬁed as households
(fraction 1 − η) and entrepreneurs (fraction η). Entrepreneurs produce capital good and
receive their external ﬁnancing from a ﬁnancial intermediary. In addition, our economy also
includes ﬁrms that produce ﬁnal consumption goods. For simplicity, producers of ﬁnal goods
do not face any ﬁnancing constraints. We now examine the behavior of each one of these
agents.

2.1

Households

Households are assumed to be inﬁnitely lived agents with identical preferences represented
by the function


U = E0

∞



β t u(ct , 1 − lt )

0<β<1

(1)

t=0

where β is the subjective discount factor and ct and lt denote, respectively, household
consumption and hours worked, as a fraction of the total time endowment. Households derive
income from renting labor and capital services at competitive rates, wt and rt , respectively.

3

Income can then be used to purchase consumption goods, at unit price, or additional capital,
at+1 , at price qt . Accordingly, the household budget constraint is described by
ct + qt at+1 = wt lt + rt at + qt (1 − δ)at

(2)

where δ is the rate of depreciation of capital. It follows that household choices are summarized
by the conditions
UL (ct , 1 − lt ) = wt Uc (ct , 1 − lt )


qt+1 (1 − δ) + rt+1
Uc (ct , 1 − lt ) = βEt Uc (ct+1 , 1 − lt+1 )
qt

(3)
(4)

In the ﬁnancing frictions literature, the Euler equation is sometimes referred to as the demand
for capital goods, or, simply, as investment demand.

2.2

Entrepreneurs

A fraction of consumers is also engaged in the production of capital goods. We call these
agents entrepreneurs and assume that they have linear preferences characterized by the
relation


E0

∞



(βγ)t cet

0<γ<1

(5)

t=0

where βγ is the entrepreneurs discount rate and cet denotes entrepreneurial consumption.
Equation (5) embeds two assumptions. First, that entrepreneurs are risk neutral and,
second, that they discount the future more heavily than households. Risk neutrality implies
that entrepreneurs will care only about expected returns and will ensure that they will
bear all risk, which simpliﬁes considerably the ﬁnancial contract below. The high rate of
discount, on the other hand, guarantees that entrepreneurs are never suﬃciently wealthy to
overcome ﬁnancing constraints. This requirement is formally equivalent to the more common
4

assumption of exponential death.
As with households, entrepreneurs derive income from renting labor and capital services
at competitive rates, wte and rt , respectively. Since leisure does not enter their utility
function, entrepreneurs devote their complete time endowment (1) to work.1 Accordingly,
the total wealth, or net worth, of an entrepreneur is given by
nt = wte + rt aet + qt (1 − δ)aet

(6)

where aet denotes the capital holdings of the entrepreneur at the beginning of period t.
Each entrepreneur also earns additional income by investing it units of consumption goods
into a technology that produces ω t it units of capital goods in the same period.2 We assume
that ω t is a random variable with positive support and is i.i.d, both across agents and over
time, with mean 1 and variance σ 2 . Also, let Φ(·) and φ(·) denote its cumulative distribution
and density functions, respectively. Following the costly state-veriﬁcation literature, we
assume that ω t is only observed by the entrepreneur. Outsiders can observe ω t only by
incurring a monitoring cost of µit units of capital goods.
Investment can be ﬁnanced by borrowing funds from ﬁnancial intermediaries. However,
the private information nature of the technology implies that this external ﬁnance is costly.
Let rtl denote the lending rate, in terms of capital goods, associated with this lending
contract.3 Speciﬁcally, an entrepreneur who borrows it − nt units of consumption agrees
to repay (1 + rtl )(it − nt ) in capital goods to the lender. However, if the realization of ω t
is too low, the entrepreneur will not be able to repay the loan and must default. This will
1

Wage income ensures that entrepreneurs have strictly positive net worth in all periods, a necessary
condition for the ﬁnancial contracting problem to be well-deﬁned.
2
In other words, no aggregate uncertainty is revealed during the life of the project. As Carlstrom and
Fuerst (1997) argue, this facilitates the sharing of risk in equilibrium.
3
Gale and Hellwig (1985) and Williamson (1987) show that in environments of this type the optimal
contract between lenders and entrepreneurs is characterized by risky debt.
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occur whenever
ω t < (1 + rtl )(it − nt )/it = ω̄ t

(7)

if the entrepreneur defaults the lender will monitor the project outcome and it will conﬁscate
all the returns from the project. It follows that entrepreneurs in default must set their
consumption, cet , and holdings of next period capital, aet+1 , equal to 0. For a successful
entrepreneur however the budget constraint will be:


qt aet+1 + cet = qt ω t it − (1 + rtl )(it − nt )

(8)

This implies that optimal decisions will satisfy the Euler equation:


qt+1 (1 − δ) + rt+1 d
1 = Et βγ
Rt+1
qt


(9)

where we deﬁne Rd = (1 + rl )q ≥ 1 as the premium on external funds paid by the
entrepreneur.4

2.3

Financial Intermediaries

Intermediaries allocate household savings by ﬁnancing the investment projects of
entrepreneurs. By funding a large number of entrepreneurs, intermediaries diversify projectspeciﬁc risk and, thus, guarantee a safe return to households, since there is no aggregate risk
during the life of the project.
Given the assumptions above, the expected income of an intermediary that ﬁnances a
project of size it with an intra-period loan in the amount of it − nt is given by

qt it g(ω̄ t ) ≡ qt
4

0

ω̄ t

ω t it Φ(dω t ) − Φ(ω t )µit + (1 − Φ(ω t ))(1 +

rtl )(it

Since all risky loans are repaid within the period, the relevant risk free rate is 1.
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− nt )

(10)

where


g(ω̄ t ) ≡

ω̄ t

0


ω t Φ(dω t ) − Φ(ω t )µ + (1 − Φ(ω t ))ω̄ t

(11)

is the fraction of the expected net output of capital goods collected by the lender.
The Optimal Financial Contract
At any point in time the expected income received by a typical entrepreneur is

qt it f (ω̄ t ) ≡ qt

∞



ω t it − (1 +

ω̄ t

rtl )(it



− nt ) Φ(dω t )

(12)

where f (ω̄ t ) is the share of production of capital goods received by entrepreneurs. Note
that our deﬁnitions imply that f (ω t ) + g(ω t ) = 1 − Φ(ω t )µ, so that a fraction Φ(ω t )µ of the
produced capital is lost to monitoring costs.
The optimal ﬁnancial contract between entrepreneurs and lenders can be summarized by
solving the following problem:

max qt it f (ω̄ t )
rtl ,ω̄ t

(13)

s.t. qt it g(ω̄ t ) ≥ (it − nt )
Intuitively, the contract is constructed to maximize entrepreneurial income, qt it f (ω̄ t ), while
satisfying the requirement that the ﬁnancial intermediary receives an expected repayment,
qt it g(ω̄ t ) equal to that of its initial investment, it − nt . It can be also shown that the contract
satisﬁes a participation constraint for the entrepreneurs’s, by guaranteeing a payoﬀ at least
as large as the amount of wealth invested, nt .5,6
5

Remember that since all project returns are revealed within the period, there is no opportunity cost to
the funds invested for both the entrepreneurs and the intermediaries.
6
This formulation also requires the usual assumption that there is enough inter-period anonymity so that
an entrepreneur’s past history of debt repayment is not observed by future lenders and, thus, it does not
aﬀect any future contracts.
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The solution to (13) is a lending rate rtl = rl (qt , nt ) for each contract and a default
threshold ω̄ t = ω(qt , nt ) such that entrepreneurs default (an lenders audit) whenever ω t < ω̄ t .
With these variables at hand it is straightforward to use (7) to derive the amount of
consumption goods investment in each project, it = i(qt , nt ). Although the exact expressions
are somewhat cumbersome it is fairly easy to show that the optimal level of the premium on
external funds, Rd , is given by
Rd =

ω̄
g(ω̄)

(14)

Since monitoring costs, Φ(ω̄)µ, increase with the default threshold, ω̄, the payoﬀ to the
ﬁnancial intermediary, g(ω̄), is less than proportional to ω̄. Hence, Rd must always be an
increasing function of the default threshold.
These optimal policy functions highlight the fact that the optimal ﬁnancial contract
depends on the model’s general equilibrium conditions, through its eﬀects on the level of
entrepreneurial net worth, nt , and through the aggregate price of capital, qt . For example,
holding net worth ﬁxed, an increase in the price of capital goods increases investment
spending, it , by entrepreneurs and, with it, borrowing requirements, it − nt . This, in turn,
drives the default threshold, ω̄ t , up, as well, and with it, the ﬁnancing premium. Ceteris
paribus, rising net worth lowers borrowing needs and, naturally, has the opposite eﬀects on
borrowing costs.

2.4

Aggregation

The linear nature of the capital goods and monitoring technologies imply that we can
construct the aggregate, expected, production of capital goods by simply adding all the

8

optimal investment policies of each entrepreneur

I(qt , nt ) ≡

0

∞


ωi(qt , nt )dΦ(ω t ) −

0

ω̄ t

µi(qt , nt )dΦ(ω t ) = i(qt , nt )[1 − µΦ(ω̄ t ))]

(15)

Equation (15) implies that only the ﬁrst moment of the distribution of net worth, nt , has
any eﬀect on the aggregate economy, thus avoiding the need to keep track of the entire
cross-section distribution of net worth across entrepreneurs. Equation (15) is often referred
as the supply curve for capital goods. Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) show that this capital
supply function is increasing in both the price of capital goods, qt , and the level of net
worth, nt . While the positive slope in qt is a standard feature in models with standard,
convex, adjustment costs, the agency problem leads investment to also be increasing in the
amount of internal funds available to the entrepreneur. Thus changes in net worth will lead
to movements in the supply of capital goods, for a given price qt .
As we will see below, the monotonicity in qt will play an important role in the asset
pricing implications of our model. Intuitively this is motivated by the rise in ﬁnancing costs
when investment increases, holding net worth ﬁxed. The corresponding rise in borrowing
requirements drives up default rates and agency costs, which increases the marginal costs to
investment and thus qt , i.e., the value of existing capital goods.

2.5

Final Goods Producers

The ﬁnal element in our economy is the set of competitive ﬁrms engaged in the production
of consumption (and investment) goods, Yt , using a constant-return-to-scale production
function
Yt = θt F (Kt , Ht , Hte )

9

(16)

Here Kt = (1− η)at + ηaet is the aggregate level of capital, Ht denotes the aggregate supply of
household labor, Hte denotes the aggregate supply of entrepreneurial labor. The optimality
conditions for these ﬁrms are given by

2.6

rt = θt FK (Kt , Ht , Hte )

(17)

wt = θt FH (Kt , Ht , Hte )

(18)

wte = θt FH e (Kt , Ht , Hte )

(19)

Competitive Equilibrium

A competitive equilibrium satisﬁes the following market clearing conditions
• Labor market
Ht = (1 − η)lt

(20)

Hte = η

(21)

• Capital goods market
Kt+1 = (1 − δ)Kt + I(qt , nt )

(22)

Yt = (1 − η)ct + ηcet + ηit

(23)

• Final goods market

2.7

Asset Returns

With the competitive equilibrium characterized it is easy to construct the returns, and
prices, of any assets. Speciﬁcally, we are interested in characterizing the returns on equity
and diﬀerent types of debt.

10

Regarding equity we can deﬁne two types of assets: household and entrepreneurs’ capital.
Given that entrepreneurs hold only a very small fraction of the wealth in the economy we will
focus on household capital.7 The model described above is formally equivalent to one where
household capital is owned by ﬁnal goods producers and where households own stocks on
these ﬁrms. Hence, in equilibrium, the value of household capital in our current formulation
is equivalent to the stock market value of ﬁnal goods producers in the alternative set-up.
Using the household Euler equation (4) this return can be deﬁned as8
K
Rt,t+1
=

qt+1 (1 − δ) + rt+1
qt

(24)

In addition, since households face no borrowing constraints they can borrow and lend
freely among themselves or directly from the ﬁnancial intermediaries. It follows that we can
use the household’s marginal rate of substitution to deﬁne the (implicit) risk free rate for
this economy as
F
Rt,t+1
=

1
.
Et [Mt,t+1 ]

(25)

,1−lt+1 )
is the marginal rate of substitution or the stochastic discount
where Mt,t+1 = β UcU(cct+1
(ct ,1−lt )

factor for this economy.

3

Results

The quantitative analysis of our model is aimed at examining the asset pricing implications
of prototypical agency cost models. Accordingly we ﬁrst start by calibrating the model
and then proceed to solve the model using the well known method of taking a log-linear
expansion around the deterministic steady-state. We then document some of the model’s
7

In any event the two returns behave almost identically in all of our examples below.
Since households have an interior solution for asset holdings, the Euler equation (4) can be used to
determine asset prices.
8
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more successful implications for the study of business cycle ﬂuctuations. Finally we provide
a careful examination of its key implications for asset pricing.

3.1

Calibration

Our calibration procedure is designed to facilitate the comparison with the existing
quantitative studies on business cycle ﬂuctuations in the context of agency cost models.
Accordingly, our benchmark choices closely replicate those proposed by Carlstrom and Fuerst
(1997). We begin by assuming that the utility function for households is of the form

U=

c1−σ − 1
+ A(1 − l),
1−σ

where the parameter A is picked so that the steady-state level of hours is equal to 0.3. The
rate of intertemporal preference is set at β = 0.99. The risk aversion parameter σ is initially
set at 1, but we also examine the case where it is equal to 5.
The production of ﬁnal goods is assumed to be of the Cobb-Douglas form
Y = θt Ktαk Htα (Hte )αe ,
and the technology shock, θ, follows the mean reverting process
θt+1 = 0.05 + 0.95 × θt + εt ,
and

εt ∼ N (0, 0.012 ).

The output elasticities are equal to, respectively αk = 0.36,

αh = 0.6399, and αhe = 0.0001. The share needs to be positive so that entrepreneurs
have positive net worth with probability one. Nevertheless, the share of entrepreneur labor
is deliberately chosen so that labor income plays a very minor role both in determining net
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worth and income distribution in our model.9
The distribution of investment outcomes, Φ(·) is assume to be lognormal, and the
monitoring cost, µ, in our benchmark calibration is set equal to 0.25.10 For robustness
we also examine the results of setting µ = 0.05, the lower bound of most empirical estimates
of bankruptcy costs (Warner (1977)). As in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), the entrepreneurs
(additional) rate of discount, γ, is selected to imply an annualized default premium of 187
basis points, the average spread between the prime rate and the rate on 3-month commercial
paper for the period between 1971 and 1996. Finally the rate of depreciation of capital
equals δ = 0.02.

3.2

Business Cycle Results

Agency cost models, and, more generally, models with ﬁnancing frictions, usually enhance
signiﬁcantly the empirical performance of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models.
Figure 1 illustrates this by depicting the impulse responses of the main macroeconomic
variables to a technology shock in our agency costs environment and in a standard
neoclassical growth model with convex adjustment costs. The adjustment cost model is
calibrated so that in steady-state the ratio of adjustment costs to investment spending is
exactly identical to the share of ﬁnancing costs in investment for the costly external ﬁnance
model.11
As can be seen from Figure 1, in the presence of agency costs, output, investment, and
hours worked exhibit a hump-shape pattern that reﬂects a delayed response to the shock
that is entirely missing in the pure adjustment cost model. It is this more realistic feature
9

Our results are independent of the choice for the share of entrepreneurs in the population, η.
Following the results in Altman (1984), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) argue that this is a reasonable
estimate of the total (direct and indirect) costs of bankruptcy.
 I 2
11
Formally adjustment costs are captured by including the term a2 K
K in the capital accumulation
=
Φ(ω)µ.
equation and picking a to satisfy aδ
2
10

13

of the model that make for much of its current appeal amongst researchers and provides for
a promising source for future studies. The hump shape and delayed investment result in
noticeable persistence in the auto-correlation function for output and investment growth —
features that Cogley and Nason (1995) document are key stylized features in the data, and
that the typical real-business cycle model has great diﬃculty replicating.12
Essentially, the intuition behind this result has to do with the fact, much like in an
environment with convex adjustment costs, the increase in investment, induced by a positive
technology shock, brings about an increase in the marginal cost of investment.

This

increase in marginal costs is a consequence of the increase in agency costs. Since almost
all of entrepreneurial net worth comes from capital, which is initially ﬁxed, the increase in
investment must be almost entirely ﬁnanced with external funds, which raises borrowing
costs. After the initial periods, as entrepreneurial capital, and with it net worth, rises, the
role of external ﬁnance declines and so do the marginal costs of investing. It is the endogenous
pattern of net worth that leads to an endogenous adjustment in marginal costs, and hence
to the hump-shaped response of the main macro aggregates. This feature is absent in most
simple adjustment cost models.13
Finally, this improvement in conditional moments does not compromise the model’s
ability to replicate the standard business cycle facts. Table 1 illustrates this by comparing
12

Although these results apply to the theoretical variables deﬁned above they are not exactly comparable
with the actual US data. We can obtain more meaningful comparisons by combining the equilibrium
conditions for both goods markets to obtain
Yt + Ytf = Ct + Xt
where Ct = (1 − η)ct + ηcet denotes aggregate consumption, Xt = η(Kt+1 − (1 − δ)Kt ) is investment spending
and the monitoring cost term, Ytf = i(qt , nt )µΦ(ω̄ t ), can be interpreted as the output of ﬁnancial services,
so that Yt + Ytf denotes the total value of goods and services produced in this artiﬁcial economy. These
series can then be mapped to the standard macro aggregates. Given our focus on asset prices, to maintain
comparability with the existing literature, we do not pursue this issue here.
13
Boldrin, Christiano and Fisher (2001) examine an environment where the reallocation of goods to the
investment sector takes one period, which also implies that adjustment costs are very high initially.
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key unconditional moments generated from the model’s stationary distribution with those
obtained from a standard quadratic adjustment cost model. Given their identical steadystate implications, the close match in the volatilities of the key macroeconomic variables
allows us to proceed by focusing on their asset pricing implications.

3.3

Asset Returns Implications

As we have seen, the empirical success of the model depends crucially on the behavior of the
marginal cost of investment during the adjustment of the economy to the underlying shocks.
However, the nature of these adjustment costs is closely linked to the presence of agency
costs and the behavior of key ﬁnancial variables. Thus, it seems important to ask whether
the ﬂuctuations in marginal adjustment costs, that form the basic propagation mechanism
in these models, is empirically plausible. Speciﬁcally, in this section, we investigate how the
key asset pricing implications of the stochastic growth model change in the presence of costly
external ﬁnance.
Table 2 shows the basic properties of asset returns in our costly external ﬁnance
environment. For comparison purposes we also provide the results for a standard neoclassic
growth model with and without adjustment costs. In all scenarios we consider the eﬀects of
increasing the risk aversion coeﬃcient, σ, from the benchmark value of 1 to 5. In addition,
we also examine the eﬀects of alternative degrees of both ﬁnancing and standard adjustment
costs to investment. Financing costs can be regulated by adjusting the level of monitoring
costs, µ.
As is now well known, increases in risk aversion work to raise the equity premium, by
raising the volatility for the stochastic discount factor, Mt,t+1 . This is true in all cases
examined in Table 2. Moreover, since our model does not allow for any trend in consumption,

15

the higher volatility in the stochastic discount factor also produces a lower level for the
F
risk free rate, Rt,t+1
. Jermann (1998) and Boldrin, Christiano and Fisher (2001) show

that introducing costs to the adjustment of the capital stock improves the asset pricing
performance of the basic model by raising both the volatility of consumption and that of
stock returns. Table 2 shows, however, that introducing costly external ﬁnance increases
the value of the premium on equity returns by a factor of about 11 relative to the convex
adjustment cost scenario — which is about twice that of the standard real business cycle
model.14
A more detailed examination is provided in Table 3. It shows the basic properties of the
pricing kernel and stock returns under several diﬀerent scenarios. While standard “physical”
adjustment costs generate higher equity premium by raising the volatility of consumption
growth and returns in similar proportions, the eﬀects of ﬁnancing costs are quite diﬀerent.
Clearly the presence of costly external ﬁnance further increases the volatility of the pricing
kernel, above and beyond the level generated by standard adjustment costs. Nevertheless,
the principal mechanism through which the model raises the equity premium, is by raising
the variance (although not the Sharpe ratio) of stock returns signiﬁcantly.
Table 3 also provides information on the behavior of the premium on external ﬁnance,
d
Rt,t+1
. Recall that this premium is only relevant for entrepreneurial loans and is thus not

priced by the households stochastic discount factor, Mt,t+1 . Regardless, as Table 3 suggests,
this ﬁnancing premium behaves very much like the returns on stocks in this model.
Table 4 provides more detailed decomposition on the role of each of these changes on
the level of equity premium. Taking as a benchmark the basic stochastic growth model, the
14

Although these equity premium numbers are still rather small they are similar to those documented
by Lettau (2002). Jermann (1998) shows that habit formation and somewhat larger adjustment costs can
signiﬁcantly magnify the model’s equity premium to match that in US data.
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second line in the Table reports the value of the equity premium due to the introduction
of standard convex adjustment costs. The remaining rows look into the role of ﬁnancing
frictions. First, we try to isolate the role of the pricing kernel, by computing the theoretical
value of the equity premium in a world where the marginal rate of substitution, Mt,t+1 ,
reﬂects the presence of ﬁnancing constraints, but where stock returns are still those of an
economy with physical adjustment costs. As can be seen, this eﬀect alone roughly doubles
the value of the equity premium to about 6 basis points. Nevertheless this value is far smaller
than the actual premium generated in the agency cost economy.
The next to last row tries to isolate the eﬀects of the ﬁnancing premium, Rd , on stock
returns, Rk . This row reports the hypothetical value of the equity premium, when the default
premium is not allowed to change over the cycle.15
The results show that without the variation in the ﬁnancing premium, the equity premium
actually disappears! In other words, it is only due to the cyclical nature of the premium
on external funds, that the ﬁnancing cost model is capable of improving the asset pricing
performance of the neoclassical growth model. As we will see below, however, these cyclical
properties of the ﬁnancing premium do not seem to be supported by the data.16

3.4

The Role of the Financing Premium

Given the intimate link between equity and ﬁnancing premiums, we now take a closer look
at the latter. Figure 2 shows the impulse responses of the main ﬁnancial variables, following
a positive innovation to the level of technology. Shown are the response of stock returns,
15

Speciﬁcally, it reports the excess stock returns, relative to risky loans, from the perspective of households.
This premium provides a measure of the component of stock returns not directly linked to ﬂuctuations in
the ﬁnancing premium.
16
More formally, in this model both Rd and Rk share a common risk factor. Our results show that the
compensation for the risks driving the ﬁnancing premium is almost identical to that for stocks. Hence, the
premium on stocks not linked to changes in the ﬁnancing premium is quite small.
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Rk , the default premium, Rd , and its main determinants, the value of Tobin’s q, and the
investment to net worth ratio i/n.
Except for magnitude, the response of the stock return resembles that obtained in the
standard convex adjustment cost model. It essentially traces the movements in the marginal
productivity of capital. In the presence of rising marginal costs to investment this response is
signiﬁcantly ampliﬁed by the increase in the price of capital goods, q. As discussed in section
2.4, in the context of our ﬁnancing cost model, this rising marginal cost is due to an increase
in borrowing costs. As entrepreneurs increase their indebtedness to ﬁnance new investment,
the default threshold rises and, from equation (14), this leads to a higher premium on external
funds. It follows that the strong response of stock returns in the agency cost model can only
be obtained with a strong increase of the default premium in periods of economic expansion.
Moreover, as Table 4 has shown, without this procyclical behavior of the ﬁnancing premium
the agency cost model is unable to produce a positive equity premium.17

3.5

Asset Returns and Pricing Factors

An alternative way to understand the asset pricing implications of the model is to look at the
link between stock prices and business cycle indicators. In particular, there is an extensive
literature documenting that stock returns lead the cycle (for example, Fama and Gibbons
(1982) and Cochrane (1991)). To accomplish this we can rewrite equation (24) as

k
Rt,t+1
=

M P Kt+1 + (1 − δ) × q
q

17

it nt
,
Kt Kt

it+1 nt+1
,
Kt+1 Kt+1

.

(26)

This procyclical variations seem to accord better with a recent strand of literature that emphasizes
enforceability, limited commitment and the cyclical variation in outside options (for example, Kehoe
and Levine (1993), Kotcherlakotta (1996), Zhang (1997), Alvarez and Jermann (2000), Albuquerque and
Hopenhayn (2001), Clementi and Hopenhayn (2001), Cooley, Quadrini, and Marimon (2001)).
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Equation (26) shows that the dynamics of the stock return in our economy are completely
driven by three aggregate, or macroeconomic, factors: productivity, M P K, the investment
to capital ratio, i/K, and the net worth to capital, n/K. Accordingly, Figure 3 displays
the correlations between Rk with various leads and lags of investment/capital (Panel A) and
productivity (Panel B). For comparison we also show the same results for our benchmark
convex adjustment cost model as well as the corresponding values for the U.S. in the period
between 1952-1999, using the NYSE value weighted returns.18
The ﬁgure shows that the ﬁnancing cost model is generally better able to replicate the
both the level and the dynamic pattern of the cross-correlations observed in the data. Most
notably, the level of the correlations for the standard convex adjustment cost model is almost
always far too high. The ﬁnancing cost model, on the other hand, is usually quite close to
the empirical values of the correlations. In addition, the agency cost model also seems
to replicate the V -like shape observed in the dynamic pattern of the empirical investment
correlations. The convex adjustment costs model, however, generates an inverted V -like
shape. Regarding the productivity correlations, the adjustment costs model still produces
correlations that are too large, but their dynamic pattern seems to be better aligned with
the data. The correlations of the ﬁnancing costs, however, has a pronounced V -shape that is
not present in the data. Figure 4 conﬁrms that these ﬁndings are quite robust to alternative
choices for the adjustment and ﬁnancing costs parameters.
Finally, Figure 5 reveals the mechanism that governs the dynamic pattern of these
correlations. Panels A and B compare the ﬁnancing premium in the model with an empirical
measure of the premium on external funds — the default premium deﬁned as the spread
between Baa and Aaa bonds. As we have documented above, the model implies that
18

Naturally, since Rk is independent of all ﬁnancing variables in the standard convex adjustment cost
model, all correlations with n/K are zero.
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the behavior of the ﬁnancing premium is strongly pro-cyclical, while in both panels, the
empirical default premia seems quite countercyclical. Figure 6 reports the same results for
the case where the default premium is measured as the spread between the prime rate and
the rate on 3-month commercial paper. Here too the observed default premium is clearly
countercyclical. Finally, Figure 7 examines the robustness of our ﬁndings by comparing the
model’s implications with alternative measures of ﬁnancing costs, constructed by Lamont,
Polk, and Saa-Requejo (2001) and Vassalou and Xing (2002).19 While these measures have
somewhat diﬀerent properties, it is clear that they are both slightly countercyclical, or at
best, fairly acyclical.

4

Conclusions

In this paper we analyzed the asset pricing properties of business cycle models that focus on
costly external ﬁnance to improve the internal propagation mechanism in standard business
cycle models. As we document in the text, this class of models has more realistic business
cycle properties, particularly with respect to the cyclical pattern of the key macroeconomic
variables. In particular, the richer endogenous dynamics allow these models to match the
observed hump-shape response of many aggregate quantities to the underlying shocks.
The asset pricing implications of these models however are not as well understood. We
show that, much like the dynamics of the key macro aggregates, they seem to be driven by the
properties of the premium on external funds. The behavior of this ﬁnancing premium maps
almost exactly into the properties of the returns to capital, and, as a result, contributes to
produce equity premiums that are both larger and more volatile, than those in comparable
19

The common factor in Lamont, Polk, and Saa-Requejo (2002) is the return spread of ﬁnancially
constrained ﬁrms over less constrained ﬁrms, quantiﬁed using the methodology of Kaplan and Zingales
(1997). Vassalou and Xing (2002) estimate default likelihood indicators for individual ﬁrms following the
methodology of Merton (1974). The aggregate default likelihood measure is then deﬁned as a simple average
of the default likelihood indicators of all ﬁrms.
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convex adjustment cost models. While both of these properties are also signiﬁcant and
desirable improvements over the standard neoclassical model, they are almost entirely
driven by a strongly procyclical ﬁnancing premium — a feature that is at odds with the
data. Intuitively, the problem is the positive association between investment and borrowing
costs, also the crucial element in generating the hump-shaped response of the main macro
variables. As a consequence, periods of high productivity (and returns) are also periods of
high investment, borrowing requirements and, as a consequence, high borrowing costs.
The results in this paper cast some doubts on the use of models with costly external
ﬁnance to explain the observed movements in aggregate variables, More importantly,
however, our analysis provides an important new dimension to investigate the empirical
success of alternative models of ﬁnancing frictions. Thus, our approach could be used to
distinguish between competing theories of the source of ﬁnancing constraints, or to motivate
the introduction of additional features such as multiperiod debt, time to build (or to ﬁnance)
and time variation in conditional default probabilities.
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Table 1 : Business Cycle Properties
This table reports the relative standard deviation of consumption, investment and hours to the standard
deviation of output. The data is quarterly from 1959.1–1999.4, using a deterministic trend.

Model
Data
Adjustment Costs
Costly External Finance

σ c /σ Y

σ i /σ Y

σ H /σ Y

0.51
0.71
0.68

2.65
2.41
2.51

0.92
0.49
0.54

Table 2 : Asset Pricing Results
This table reports the annualized (log) risk free rate and the (log) equity premium on household capital. The
risk free rate is deﬁned as 1/Et [Mt+1 ] where M is the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution for the
households. The equity premium is deﬁnes as the diﬀerence between the (log) return to household capital
and the (log) risk free rate deﬁned above. All the moments are in percentage.

Model

E[rt,f ]

k
E[rt,t+1
− rt,f ]

Standard Growth Model
σ=1
σ=5

4.016
4.008

0.001
0.001

Adjustment Costs
σ = 1, a = 0.122
σ = 5, a = 0.122
σ = 1, a = 20

4.014
4.005
3.997

0.001
0.002
0.004

Costly External Finance
σ = 1, µ = 0.25
σ = 5, µ = 0.25
σ = 1, µ = 0.05

4.001
3.988
4.006
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0.017
0.022
0.012

Table 3 : Volatility
,1−lt+1 )
This table reports the volatility of the (log) pricing kernel, mt+1 = log β UcU(cct+1
, denoted σ(mt+1 ),
(ct ,1−lt )
k
k
) and Sharpe ratio S(rt,t+1
) of the (log) return to capital (owned by households),
and volatility σ(rt,t+1
k
d
d
rt,t+1 = log Rt,t+1 , and the (log) ﬁnancing premium, rt,t+1
= log Rt,t+1
. Also included is the covariance of
the return on capital and the pricing kernel. All numbers, except the Sharpe ratios, are in percentage.

σ(mt+1 )

Model

k
σ(rt,t+1
)

k
cov(mt+1 , rt,t+1
)

d
σ(rt,t+1
)

k
S(rt,t+1
)

-0.001
-0.001

0
0

0.008
0.015

-0.002
-0.002
-0.004

0
0
0

0.010
0.017
0.021

1.274
1.157
1.318

0.013
0.020
0.012

Standard Growth Model
σ=1
σ=5

0.880
1.572

0.119
0.082
Adjustment Costs

σ = 1, a = 0.122
σ = 5, a = 0.122
σ = 1, a = 20

1.098
1.744
2.153

0.135
0.095
0.200

Costly External Finance
σ = 1, µ = 0.25
σ = 5, µ = 0.25
σ = 1, µ = 0.05

1.971
2.556
1.709

1.256
1.115
0.989

-0.025
-0.029
-0.017

Table 4 : Decomposing Risk Premia
This table decomposes the increase in risk premia due to the presence of frictions to capital accumulation.
In the model with costly external ﬁnance, we separate the eﬀects attributable to changes in the pricing
kernel and those attributable to changes in the default premium. Speciﬁcally, in the third line we compute
fc
k,ac
k,ac
-Covt (log Mt+1
, log Rt,t+1
) − 0.5Vart (log Rt,t+1
) where ac and f c stand for the adjustment and ﬁnancing
fc
k,f c
d
cost economies respectively. In the fourth line we compute -Covt (log Mt+1
, log Rt,t+1
− log Rt,t+1
)−
k,f c
d
0.5Vart (log Rt,t+1 − log Rt,t+1 ). The premium in the (log) benchmark neoclassical model is normalized
to 100.

Eﬀect
Benchmark Model
Adjustment Costs

σ=1

σ=5

100
142

129
165

Costly External Finance
Change in Pricing Kernel
Acyclical Default Premium
All Features

263
-37
1729
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344
-111
2283

Figure 1 : Impulse Responses — Quantities
This ﬁgure plots the impulse response of output, household consumption, household hours and investment
to a technology shock. The solid lines are from the agency cost model and the dotted lines are from the
standard adjustment cost model.
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Figure 2 : Impulse Responses — Asset Prices
k
d
This ﬁgure plots the impulse response of the return of household capital rt,t+1
, the default premium rt,t+1
,
investment to net worth, i/n, and Tobin’s Q to a technology shock. The solid lines are from the agency cost
model and the dotted lines are from the standard adjustment cost model.
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Figure 3 : Correlation Structure — Stock Returns (a = .122 and µ = .25)
This ﬁgure presents the lead-lag correlations between the return on capital in the model and the investmentcapital ratio (Panel A) and the technology shocks (Panel B). The data denotes the CRSP value weighted
returns.
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Figure 4 : Correlation Structure — Stock Returns (a = 20 and µ = .05)
This ﬁgure presents the lead-lag correlations between the return on capital in the model and the investmentcapital ratio (Panel A) and the technology shocks (Panel B). The data denotes the CRSP value weighted
returns.
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Figure 5 : Correlation Structure — Default Premium I
This ﬁgure presents the lead-lag correlations of the default premium with investment-capital ratio (Panel A)
and total factor productivity (Panel B). The solid line uses our ﬁrst measure of default premium in the data,
deﬁned as the yield spread between Baa and Aaa rated corporate bonds. The broken line is the implied
default premium in the Agency Cost model.
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Figure 6 : Correlation Structure — Default Premium II
This ﬁgure presents the lead-lag correlations of the default premium with investment-capital ratio (Panel
A) and total factor productivity (Panel B). The solid line uses our second measure of the default premium
in the data, deﬁned as the spread between prime bank loan rate and 3-month commercial paper rate. The
broken line is the implied default premium in the Agency Cost model.
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Figure 7 : Correlation Structure — Alternative Measures of Financing Premium
This ﬁgure presents the lead-lag correlations of the external ﬁnancing premium with investment-capital ratio
(Panel A) and with total factor productivity (Panel B). Three measures of external ﬁnancing premium are
presented: the Lamont, Polk, and Saá-Requejo (2001) measure (the star line), the Vassalou (2002) measure
(the plus line), and the implied measure in the Agency Cost model (the broken line).
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